Italian we have and adjective missing in English *"icastico"* from the greek *eikastikos).*

3. a language as precise as possible, both lexically and in conveying the nuances of thought and imagination (Calvino, 1995, p. 677).

Another important point concerns the concept that today we have of culture and science, more complex and less simplistic than that proposed by Snow. For example, the research of the philosophers of science have helped to better understand the scientist's work method (see for example Thomas Kuhn's idea that scientific change does not invariably take the form of a steady accumulation of knowledge within stable parameters; anomalies in the evidence accumulate to the point where change takes the form of a "discontinuous jump" or "paradigm shift"). Furthermore, researches by the sociologists of science have highlighted how the very constitution of scientific knowledge itself is dependent upon culturally variable norms and practices, seen in this way science is merely one set of cultural activities among others, as much an expression of a society's orientation to the world as its art or religion, and equally inseparable from fundamental issues of politics and morality. Science, then, seen as a "social construct".

The third point is the discourse on creativity: those who watch closely the great watersheds in scientific thought and technological innovations themselves, cannot but recognise how the most creative aspects have overthrown all disciplinary fences.

By investigating the relationship (links, affinities, differences, questions and problems) between the sciences and the humanities more deeply an idea of mutual influences arises that favours a more dynamic idea of interfacing. Therefore, a starting and fundamental point is to acknowledge the isomorphism of the two fields that, to respond to their own actuality and societal matrices, have often simultaneously developed new models and strategies in investigating complex scientific and cultural (artistic, literary) phenomena. This idea of isomorphism (Hayles, 1984) is no longer linked to the traditional ideas of cause and effect, but instead implies simultaneity and not consequentiality: one of the two fields does not influence or condition the other one. Isomorphism implies, indeed,